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Twin-field quantum key distribution with fully discrete phase randomization
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Twin-field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) can overcome fundamental secret-key-rate
bounds on point-to-point QKD links, allowing us to reach longer distances than ever before. Since
its introduction, several TF-QKD variants have been proposed, and some of them have already been
implemented experimentally. Most of them assume that the users can emit weak coherent pulses
with a continuous random phase. In practice, this assumption is often not satisfied, which could
open up security loopholes in their implementations. To close this loophole, we propose and prove
the security of a TF-QKD variant that relies exclusively on discrete phase randomisation. Remark-
ably, our results show that it can also provide higher secret-key rates than counterpart protocols
that rely on continuous phase randomisation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users, Alice and Bob, to generate a shared secret key in the presence
of an eavesdropper, Eve, with unlimited computational power. Despite its great potential, QKD has yet to overcome
important practical problems before it is ready for widespread use. One of the most important challenges is how
to perform QKD at long distances, given that, in optical fibres, the loss increases exponentially with the channel
length. Even with a GHz repetition rate, it would take 300 years to successfully send a single photon over 1000 km of
standard optical fibres [1]. Another crucial issue is to guarantee that a particular implementation of a QKD protocol
is secure. That is, we have to either show that our implementation satisfies all assumptions made in the corresponding
theoretical security proof, or to devise a security proof that matches the realities of an experiment. In this work, we
do the latter for one of the most advanced QKD protocols, known as twin-field QKD (TF-QKD) [2], as one of the
key candidates for improving key rate scaling with distance.
Fundamental bounds show that the key rate of repeaterless QKD protocols scales at best linearly with η [3], where
η is the transmittance of the channel connecting Alice and Bob. TF-QKD breaks this limitation by offering a key rate
that scales with
√
η. The key enabling idea behind TF-QKD operation is to effectively generate an entangled state
between the two users in the space spanned by vacuum and single-photon states. To do so, we need a repeater node
that performs entanglement swapping, using single-photon interference, as well as phase stability across the channel
to make sure the generated state is in the desired superposition form. This approach requires only one photon to
survive the path loss over half of the channel, thus the improved scaling with distance. Note that TF-QKD is not
the only protocol that achieves this scaling. There are other protocols, inspired by quantum repeater structures,
that achieve the same rate scaling by using quantum memories [4, 5] and/or quantum non-demolition measurements
[6]. But, TF-QKD is, experimentally, in a more advanced state than such alternatives. In fact, certain variants of
TF-QKD have already been implemented experimentally [7–10], and a distance record exceeding 500 km has already
been achieved [11]. This would make the implementation security issue crucially relevant for TF-QKD experiments.
One of the key practical constraints on a QKD system is imposed by the type of optical source/encoder needed in
the respective protocol. The corresponding security proof would then need to match such practical constraints. The
single-photon version of TF-QKD has a simple theoretical description [12], but it is difficult to implement in practice.
Thus, a significant research effort has focused on developing practical variants [12–15] in which the users encode weak
coherent pulses (WCPs). These variants differ in their protocol descriptions and/or security proofs, but, so far, all
of them rely on the decoy-state method [16]. That is, they either use decoy states in their key mode [13, 14], i.e., to
generate the key, and/or in their test mode [12, 15], i.e., to estimate Eve’s side information on the key.
Conventional decoy-state techniques require the use of phase-randomised coherent states (PRCS). This implies that
the users are ideally able to randomise the global phase of their pulses continuously and uniformly. This is, however,
difficult to achieve in practice. Experimentally, there are two approaches to randomise the phase of a coherent pulse:
passive and active. Passive randomisation consists of turning the laser off and then on again to generate the PRCS.
In addition to the impracticality of this approach in a high-rate QKD system, it is hard to guarantee experimentally
that the generated phase genuinely follows a uniform distribution [17]. In fact, experiments have shown that, in
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2practice, there are phase correlations between adjacent pulses [18, 19]. In an active randomisation procedure, a phase
modulator is used, in combination with a random number generator. This approach fits the TF-QKD variant of
Refs. [12, 15] very well, since one already needs a phase modulator to produce the phase-locked coherent states sent
in the key mode. However, it randomises the phase over a discrete, not continuous, set of values. Thus, none of these
two approaches necessarily satisfy the assumptions of the decoy-state method, which could open security loopholes in
the experimental implementations of TF-QKD.
In this work, we address such security loopholes, in the context of TF-QKD, by proposing a variant that relies
on discrete phase randomisation in both key and test modes. The quantum phase of our protocol is similar to that
of Refs. [12, 15], with the main difference being that we use discrete, not continuous, phase randomisation in the
test mode as well. This would allow us to use additional post-selection in the test mode when users have both used
matching phase values, i.e., either exactly the same phases, or those with a phase difference of exactly pi. The concept
of phase discretisation, and its corresponding post-selection, has also appeared in some other TF-QKD variants. For
instance, in phase-matching QKD [14], phase slices are introduced for post-selection. Nevertheless, they still rely
on continuous phase randomisation for their encoded states. The same applies to the test mode of the protocol
introduced in [20], in which they generalise the key-mode encoding space in [12, 15] from a two-state discrete space
to a multiple-state discrete space. In sending-or-not-sending variant, in both modes, we rely on continuous phase
randomisation. By totally removing the continuous phase randomisation, in this work, we then offer a security proof
that is aligned with the realities of the existing implementations. Table I shows how different TF-QKD variants are
compared in terms of using discrete phase randomisation.
Protocol Key mode Test mode Phase-based Post-selection
Phase Matching QKD [14] Continuous Continuous Yes (both modes)
Sending-or-not-sending TF-QKD [13] Continuous Continuous Yes (test mode)
TF-QKD in Refs. [12, 15] Discrete Continuous No
Discrete Phase Matching QKD [20] Discrete Continuous Yes (test mode)
This work Discrete Discrete Yes (test mode)
Table I. A comparison between major TF-QKD variants and whether they use continuous or discrete phase randomisation for
their key/test modes. The post-selection column specifies if in the post-processing stage, signals with similar phases will be
post-selected or not.
One of the key contributions of this work is to offer a rigorous security proof for TF-QKD with discrete phase
randomisation in its test mode. Note that discrete phase randomisation has already been considered in Ref. [17] for
a decoy-state BB84 protocol. In [17], discrete phase randomisation can be considered as a source flaw. Consequently,
they find that, while the secret key rate obtainable using discrete randomisation is always strictly worse than using
continuous randomisation, the former quickly approaches the latter as the number of discrete random phases increases.
In fact, one can obtain a performance reasonably close to the continuous case using as few as ten random phases.
However, it is not immediately clear whether this behaviour will hold for the TF-QKD variants in [12–15], given that:
(i) their security proofs are quite diverse, and some of them are very different from that of decoy-state BB84; and
(ii) in TF-QKD, both users emit quantum states, thus the source flaw is present in both users. In fact, recent works
have found that the security issue arising from flawed sources that leak information has a much bigger impact in
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [21] than in BB84 [22]. In principle, the same could be true for other
kinds of source imperfections, such as the use of discrete phase randomisation.
Surprisingly, in our protocol, we realise that, by using discrete phase randomisation, the key rate can actually
improve over the TF-QKD variant in Ref. [12]. This is because discrete phase randomisation allows the users to
postselect the detected test mode rounds in which their encoded phase values perfectly match. This postselected data
turns out to result in a tighter estimation of the phase-error rate compared with the approach in Ref. [12], which
relies on continuous phase randomisation without phase postselection. The fact that, in TF-QKD, users may share
the same phase reference would also make this post-selection process practically possible—something which may not
be available in BB84 or MDI-QKD protocols.
Similar to some other protocols that rely on discrete randomisation [17], we use numerical techniques as part of our
security proof. In particular, we use semidefinite programming (SDP) techniques, inspired by the work of Ref. [23], to
estimate the phase-error rate. We note that, in Ref. [23], the authors already apply their generic numerical technique
to prove the security of a TF-QKD protocol with fully discrete phase randomisation. However, their procedure is
only efficient for cases in which only a few discrete phases is used. Here, we exploit the particularities of our protocol
to introduce an analysis that uses a much smaller number of carefully chosen constraints. The corresponding SDP
can efficiently be solved even with a large number of discrete phases, which allows us to investigate how the key rate
improves when increasing the number of phase values.
3II. METHODS
A. Protocol description
Our protocol is very similar to that of Refs. [12, 15]. Alice and Bob send quantum signals to an untrusted middle
node Charlie, who (ideally) interferes them at a balanced 50:50 beamsplitter, performs a photodetection measurement,
and reports the outcome. These signals belong to one of two “modes”, key and test, selected at random. Key mode
emissions are used to generate the raw key, while test mode emissions are used to estimate Eve’s side information
on the raw key. In key mode, the users send phase-locked coherent states
∣∣±√µ〉. In test mode, the users send
phase-randomised coherent states of different intensities. Unlike in Refs. [12, 15], the phases of the test-mode states
are randomised over a discrete set, rather than a continuous range. The detailed protocol steps are as follows:
(1) Preparation
Alice (Bob) randomly choose the transmission mode, key or test, and
(1.1) If she (he) chooses key mode, she (he) generates a random bit bA (bB), prepares an optical pulse in the coherent
state
∣
∣(−1)bA√µ〉 (
∣
∣(−1)bB√µ〉), and sends it to Charlie.
(1.2) If she (he) chooses test mode, she (he) selects a random intensity βa (βb) ∈ {β1, . . . , βd−2, µ, βv}, where µ is the same
intensity used in key mode, and βv = 0 is a vacuum intensity. Then, she (he) selects a random phase θa (θb) =
2pim
M
with m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1}, prepares the state
∣
∣√βaeiθa
〉
(
∣
∣√βbeiθb
〉
), and sends it to Charlie.
(2) Detection
An honest Charlie interferes Alice and Bob’s signals at a 50:50 beamsplitter, followed by threshold detectors Dc and Dd
placed at the output ports corresponding to constructive and destructive interference, respectively. A round is considered
successful if exactly one detector clicks, and unsuccessful otherwise. After the measurement, Charlie reports whether or
not the round was successful, and, if it was, he reports which specific detector clicked.
(3) Sifting
For all successful rounds, Alice and Bob disclose their choices of key mode or test mode, keeping only data from those in
which they have used the same mode. Then,
(3.1) They calculate the gain psucc of their key mode rounds, and generate their sifted keys from the values of bA and
bB corresponding to these rounds. Then, they publicly disclose a small random subset of their sifted keys. With
this information, they estimate the fraction of the sifted key, psame|succ (pdiff|succ), that originated from emissions
in which their phase choices agreed (disagreed). Bob then flips his sifted key bits corresponding to the rounds in
which Dd clicked. Based on that, Alice and Bob estimate the bit error rate ebit.
(3.2) For all possible values of β, Alice and Bob calculate the gains {Qβ} of the test mode rounds in which they both
used intensity β and the same phase θa = θb. They also calculate the gains {Q−β } of the rounds in which they both
used intensity β and opposite phases θa = θb ± pi.
(4) Parameter estimation
Alice and Bob use the values of {Qβ} and {Q−β } to estimate the amount of key information IAE that may have been
leaked to an eavesdropper.
(5) Postprocessing
Alice and Bob perform error correction and privacy amplification to obtain a secret key.
Since this is a discretely-modulated MDI-type protocol, in principle, one could directly use the numerical techniques
of Ref. [23] to prove its security. However, the SDP in Ref. [23] requires one constraint, in the form of an inner product,
for each combination of emitted states. The number of different states sent in this protocol can then make such an
approach infeasible in practice. Namely, since Alice and Bob send [(d− 1)M + 1]2 different combinations of states1,
one needs to solve the dual problem of an SDP with [(d− 1)M + 1]4 inner-product constraints, plus the constraints
related to the measurement results of the protocol. Thus, even for M = 4 and d = 3, the simplest case considered
in the numerical results of this paper, one needs to solve a SDP with more than 6561 constraints. For M = 12 and
d = 3, the number of constraints grows to more than 390625. This can make the implementation of such techniques
infeasible on conventional computers [24, 25].
In the following, we provide a security analysis that requires to solve the dual problem of two SDPs with only
(d − 1)(d − 2)M + 2d +M − 1 constraints each. That is, for the examples considered above, we have SDPs with 17
and 41 constraints, respectively, which can be quickly solved using any commercial off-the-shelf laptop.
1 To compute the number of states, note that the set of test-mode states contains the set of key-mode states, so one only needs to count
the former. Also, when Alice or Bob choose the vacuum intensity, they send the same vacuum state, independently of their choice of
random phase.
4B. Security analysis
In our security analysis, we consider the asymptotic scenario in which the users emit an infinite number of signals.
Also, for simplicity, we assume collective attacks. We note that, in the asymptotic regime, security against collective
attacks implies security against general attacks, thanks to results such as the postselection technique [26].
We consider the virtual protocol in which Alice replaces her key mode emissions by the generation of the state
|ψ〉Aa =
1√
2
(|0〉A |√µ〉a + |1〉A |−√µ〉a) , (1)
where A is a virtual qubit ancilla that she keeps in her lab, and a is the photonic system sent to Charlie; and Bob
replaces them by a similarly defined |ψ〉Bb. We assume that Eve controls not only the quantum channels, but also
the untrusted middle node Charlie, and the announcements he makes. From a security standpoint, we can describe
Eve’s collective attack as a two-outcome2 general measurement {Mˆab, Mˆfab} on the photonic systems ab, where Mˆab
(Mˆfab) is the Kraus operator corresponding to a successful (unsuccessful) announcement. Conditioned on a success,
Alice and Bob obtain a state,
|Ψ〉AaBb =
Mˆab |ψ〉Aa |ψ〉Bb√
psucc
, (2)
where psucc =
∥∥∥Mˆab |ψ〉Aa |ψ〉Bb∥∥∥2 is the probability that Eve will announce a key mode round as successful.
In our virtual protocol, after Eve’s announcements, Alice and Bob perform the joint measurement {Oˆsame, Oˆdiff},
with Oˆsame = |00〉〈00|AB + |11〉〈11|AB and Oˆdiff = |01〉〈01|AB + |10〉〈10|AB, on the ancillas corresponding to the
successful rounds, learning whether they used the same or different phases3. Depending on the result, they will obtain
one of the two post-measurement states
|Ψsame〉 =
|00〉AB Mˆab
∣∣√µ〉
a
∣∣√µ〉
b
+ |11〉AB Mˆab
∣∣−√µ〉
a
∣∣−√µ〉
b
2
√
psucc,same
, (3)
|Ψdiff〉 =
|01〉AB Mˆab
∣∣√µ〉
a
∣∣−√µ〉
b
+ |10〉AB Mˆab
∣∣−√µ〉
a
∣∣√µ〉
b
2
√
psucc,diff
, (4)
where psucc,same = psuccpsame|succ (psucc,diff = psuccpdiff|succ) is the probability that Alice and Bob use the same
(different) phases in a key mode round and Eve reports the round as successful. This allows us to define the quantities
eph,same = ‖AB〈++|Ψsame〉‖2 + ‖AB〈−−|Ψsame〉‖2, (5)
eph,diff = ‖AB〈++|Ψdiff〉‖2 + ‖AB〈−−|Ψdiff〉‖2, (6)
where eph,same (eph,diff) is the phase-error rate of the successful key mode rounds in which Alice and Bob used the
same (different) phases. Eve’s side information of the sifted key (per key bit) can now be bounded by
IAE ≤ psame|succh(eph,same) + pdiff|succh(eph,diff), (7)
where h(x) = −x log2 x− (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the Shannon binary entropy function. The secret key rate that Alice
and Bob can distill is
R ≥ psucc [1− IAE − fh(ebit)] , (8)
where f is the error correction inefficiency.
The objective of our security analysis is to obtain upper bounds on eph,same and eph,diff , based on the data obtained
in the test rounds. The procedure is very similar for both terms; we will first explain eph,same.
2 Note that Charlie not only reports whether or not a round was successful, but also whether he obtained constructive or destructive
interference. However, the latter announcement only determines whether or not Bob applies a bit flip, which does not affect Eve’s side
information. Thus, from a security standpoint, we can assume that Eve’s general measurement only has two outcomes.
3 Note that, to generate the raw key, Alice and Bob project their ancillas A and B in {|0〉 , |1〉}. Since the joint measurement commutes
with this projection, it is a valid virtual protocol step.
51. Estimation of eph,same
First, we rewrite Eq. (3) as
|Ψsame〉 =
(|++〉+ |−−〉)AB Mˆab |λeven〉ab + 12 (|+−〉+ |−+〉)AB Mˆab |λodd〉ab
2
√
psucc,same
, (9)
with |λeven〉ab and |λodd〉ab being unnormalised states defined as
|λeven〉ab =
1
2
(|√µ〉
a
|√µ〉
b
+ |−√µ〉
a
|−√µ〉
b
) =
∑
n∈N0
√
Pn|µ |λn〉ab , (10)
|λodd〉ab =
1
2
(|√µ〉
a
|√µ〉
b
− |−√µ〉
a
|−√µ〉
b
) =
∑
n∈N1
√
Pn|µ |λn〉ab , (11)
where N0 (N1) is the set of non-negative even (odd) numbers, |λn〉 is the n-photon two-mode Fock state defined by
|λn〉ab =
1√
2nn!
(a† + b†)n |00〉ab , (12)
and
Pn|µ =
e−2µ(2µ)n
n!
, (13)
follows a Poisson distribution of average 2µ. Combining Eq. (5) and Eq. (9), we have that
eph,same =
1
2psucc,same
∥∥∥Mˆab |λeven〉ab∥∥∥2. (14)
How to estimate the quantity in Eq. (14) would be critical in our security proof. One possible approach would be to
apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to show that
∥∥∥Mˆab |λeven〉ab∥∥∥2 ≤
[ ∑
n∈N0
√
Pn|µYn
]2
, (15)
where Yn =
∥∥∥Mˆab |λn〉ab∥∥∥2 is the yield probability of the state |λn〉ab. Let us assume that Alice and Bob used
continuous phase-randomisation on their test mode emissions, and kept only the data from the events in which they
use the same intensity and the same phase. Then, the resulting post-selected state, given that they both chose
intensity β, can be expressed as
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
∣∣∣√βeiθ〉 ∣∣∣√βeiθ〉〈√βeiθ∣∣∣ 〈√βeiθ∣∣∣
ab
=
∞∑
n=0
Pn|β |λn〉〈λn|ab , (16)
where Pn|β follows a Poisson distribution and is given by Eq. (13). Then, one could apply the standard decoy
state method to estimate the yield probabilities Yn, ∀n ∈ N0, and plug these in Eq. (15) to estimate Eq. (14). This
approach is similar to that of Ref. [20]. However, note that if Alice and Bob used continuous phase-randomisation, the
probability that Alice and Bob select exactly the same phase θ is zero, and the resulting protocol is not implementable
in practice.
Here, we use the same test-mode phase-postselection idea as in Ref. [20], but we employ discrete phase-randomisation,
which results in a protocol that is actually implementable in practice. In this case, Eq. (16) becomes
ρβ =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
∣∣∣√βe 2ipimM 〉 ∣∣∣√βe 2ipimM 〉〈√βe 2ipimM ∣∣∣ 〈√βe 2ipimM ∣∣∣
ab
=
M−1∑
n=0
P
β
nmodM
∣∣∣λβnmodM〉〈λβnmodM ∣∣∣
ab
, (17)
where ρβ is the post-selected state when Alice and Bob both used intensity β and the same phase [17]. In Eq. (17),
we have ∣∣∣λβnmodM〉
ab
=
∞∑
l=0
√
PMl+n|β
P
β
nmodM
|λMl+n〉ab , (18)
P
β
nmodM =
∞∑
l=0
PMl+n|β . (19)
6and Pn|β is given by Eq. (13).
Note that for the vacuum intensity βv, we have that
ρβv =
∣∣∣λβv0modM〉〈λβv0modM ∣∣∣
ab
= |λ0〉〈λ0|ab . (20)
Unlike the states |λn〉 in Eq. (16), the states
∣∣∣λβnmodM〉 in Eq. (17) have a slight dependence on the intensity β.
Thus, their yield probabilities,
Y
β
nmodM =
∥∥∥Mˆab ∣∣∣λβnmodM〉
ab
∥∥∥2, (21)
are not equal for two different intensities β1 and β2, which prevents us from applying the standard decoy-state method.
Instead, we use a similar idea as in Ref. [23], defining the Gram matrix G of the set of Eve’s post-measurement states,
and constructing a semidefinite program where the objective function and all the constraints are linear functions
of entries of G. In our case, we define G as the Gram matrix of the vector set
{
Mˆab
∣∣∣λβnmodM〉}, ∀β ∈ T and
n ∈ {0, 1, ...,M − 1}, where T is the set of all test-mode intensities, except vacuum. The entries of G are Gij = 〈i|j〉,
where |i〉 denotes the i-th element of the vector set.
Our objective function is Eq. (14), which we can write as
eph,same =
1
2psucc,same
〈λeven|Mˆ †abMˆab|λeven〉 (22)
By re-expressing |λeven〉 and |λodd〉 in Eqs. (10) and (11) as
|λeven〉ab =
M−1∑
n=0
n∈N0
√
P
µ
nmodM |λµnmodM 〉ab ,
|λodd〉ab =
M−1∑
n=0
n∈N1
√
P
µ
nmodM |λµnmodM 〉ab ,
(23)
it becomes clear that the right-hand side of Eq. (22) is a linear function of elements of G.
We obtain our first constraint by taking the norm squared of both sides of Eq. (3), and solving for psucc,same,
obtaining
psucc,same =
1
2
〈λeven|Mˆ †Mˆ |λeven〉+ 1
2
〈λodd|Mˆ †Mˆ |λodd〉 . (24)
From Eq. (17), we have that
Qβ =
M−1∑
n=0
P
β
nmodMY
β
nmodM , (25)
where Qβ is the measured gain of the state ρβ . Note that Y
β
nmodM is a (diagonal) element of G, thus Eq. (25) is a
linear function of elements of G.
The next constraints use the trace distance inequality [17]
Y
β1
nmodM − Y β2nmodM ≤
√
1− F β1,β2n , (26)
where
F β1,β2n =
∣∣∣〈λβ1nmodM ∣∣∣λβ2nmodM〉
ab
∣∣∣2 =
[
∞∑
l=0
√
PMl+n|β1
P
β1
nmodM
√
PMl+n|β2
P
β2
nmodM
]2
. (27)
Our next constraint is based on the inequality
Y
β1
nmodM ≤ 1− Y β2nmodM + 2
√
F
β1,β2
n (1 − F β1,β2n )(1 − Y β2nmodM )Y β2nmodM + F β1,β2n (2Y β2nmodM − 1), (28)
7which is tighter than the trace distance inequality in Eq. (26), but cannot be added to the SDP, since it is a non-linear
function of Y β2nmodM , an element of G. The only exception is the case n = 0 and β2 = βv, since from Eq. (20), we
have that
Y
βv
0modM = Y0 = Qβv , (29)
and Qβv is directly measurable from the protocol. Thus, substituting n = 0, β1 = β, β2 = βv and Y
βv
0modM = Qβv in
Eq. (28), we have the inequality
Y
β
0modM ≤ 1−Qβv + 2
√
F
β,βv
0 (1− F β,βv0 )(1 −Qβv)Qβv + F β,βv0 (2Qβv − 1), (30)
which is a linear function of Y β0modM .
For our final constraints, we use the fact that Y βnmodM ≤ 1, ∀n, β. To reduce the number of constraints, we only
include the case β = µ.
Combining everything, we have that our upper-bound on eph,same is the solution of the following SDP
max
G
1
2psucc,same
〈λeven|Mˆ †Mˆ |λeven〉 s.t.
psucc,same =
1
2
〈λeven|Mˆ †Mˆ |λeven〉+ 1
2
〈λodd|Mˆ †Mˆ |λodd〉 ,
Qβ =
M−1∑
n=0
P
β
nmodMY
β
nmodM , ∀β ∈ T ,
Y
µ
nmodM ≤ 1, ∀n ∈ {0, ...,M − 1},
Y
β1
nmodM − Y β2nmodM ≤
√
1− F β1,β2n , ∀β1, β2 ∈ T , n ∈ {0, ...,M − 1},
Y
β
0modM ≤ 1−Qβv + 2
√
F
β,βv
0 (1− F β,βv0 )(1 −Qβv)Qβv + F β,βv0 (2Qβv − 1), ∀β ∈ T ,
(31)
where T = {β1, . . . , βd−2, µ} is the set of all test-mode intensities, except vacuum.
2. Estimation of eph,diff
The procedure to estimate eph,diff is very similar to that of eph,same. In this case, we rewrite Eq. (4) as
|Ψdiff〉 =
(|++〉− |−−〉)AB Mˆab |λ−even〉ab + 12 (|−+〉 − |+−〉)AB Mˆab
∣∣λ−odd〉ab
2
√
psucc,diff
, (32)
where |λ−even〉 and
∣∣λ−odd〉 are unnormalised states defined as
∣∣λ−even〉ab = 12(|√µ〉a |−√µ〉b + |−√µ〉a |√µ〉b) =
∑
n+m∈N0
cncm |n〉a |m〉b =
∑
n∈N0
√
Pn|µ
∣∣λ−n 〉ab , (33)
∣∣λ−odd〉ab = 12(|√µ〉a |−√µ〉b − |−√µ〉a |√µ〉b) =
∑
n+m∈N1
cncm |n〉a |m〉b =
∑
n∈N1
√
Pn|µ
∣∣λ−n 〉ab , (34)
|λ−n 〉 is the n-photon two-mode Fock state defined by∣∣λ−n 〉ab = 1√2nn! (a† − b†)n |00〉ab , (35)
and Pn|µ is given by Eq. (13). In this case, the state after post-selecting the test mode emissions in which Alice and
Bob both used intensity β and the opposite phases θa = θb ± pi = θ is
ρ−β =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
∣∣∣√βe 2ipimM 〉 ∣∣∣−√βe 2ipimM 〉〈√βe 2ipimM ∣∣∣ 〈−√βe 2ipimM ∣∣∣
ab
=
M−1∑
n=0
P
β
nmodM
∣∣∣λβ,−nmodM〉〈λβ,−nmodM ∣∣∣
ab
, (36)
8where
∣∣∣λβ,−nmodM〉
ab
=
∞∑
l=0
√
PMl+n|β
P
β
nmodM
∣∣λ−Ml+n〉ab , (37)
Pn|β is given by Eq. (13), and P
β
nmodM is given by Eq. (19).
Similarly as in the previous subsection, we re-express |λ−even〉 and
∣∣λ−odd〉 as
∣∣λ−even〉ab =
M−1∑
n=0
n∈N0
√
P
µ
nmodM
∣∣λµ,−nmodM〉ab ,
∣∣λ−odd〉ab =
M−1∑
n=0
n∈N1
√
P
µ
nmodM
∣∣λµ,−nmodM〉ab ,
(38)
and define
Y
β,−
nmodM =
∥∥∥Mˆab ∣∣∣λβ,−nmodM〉
ab
∥∥∥2. (39)
This time, we define G as the Gram matrix of the vector set
{
Mˆab
∣∣∣λβ,−nmodM〉}, and follow a similar procedure as
in last subsection to construct the objective function and the constraints. In the end, we have that our upper-bound
on eph,diff is the solution of the following SDP
max
G
1
2psucc,diff
〈
λ−even
∣∣Mˆ †Mˆ ∣∣λ−even〉 s.t.
psucc,diff =
1
2
〈
λ−even
∣∣Mˆ †Mˆ ∣∣λ−even〉+ 12 〈λ−odd
∣∣Mˆ †Mˆ ∣∣λ−odd〉 ,
Q−β =
M−1∑
n=0
P
β
nmodMY
β,−
nmodM , ∀β ∈ T ,
Y
µ,−
nmodM ≤ 1, ∀n ∈ {0, ...,M − 1},
Y
β1,−
nmodM − Y β2,−nmodM ≤
√
1− F β1,β2n , ∀β1, β2 ∈ T , n ∈ {0, ...,M − 1},
Y
β,−
0modM ≤ 1−Q−βv + 2
√
F
β,βv
0 (1− F β,βv0 )(1 −Q−βv)Q−βv + F
β,βv
0 (2Q
−
βv
− 1), ∀β ∈ T ,
(40)
where F β1,β2n is given by Eq. (27) and T = {β1, . . . , βd−2, µ} is the set of all test-mode intensities, except vacuum.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here, we simulate the secret key rate obtainable as a function of the overall Alice-Bob loss, which includes the
inefficiency of Charlie’s detectors, for different values of M , the number of random phases. For the sake of our
numerical simulations, we assume that there is no eavesdropper, and we only model the imperfections in the system
to simulate the values one may obtain in a real experiment. We assume a misalignment error rate of 2%, matching
the results of a recent experiment [7], and a dark count probability of 10−8 per pulse. In all curves, we assume that
Alice and Bob use three different test-mode intensities {β1, µ, βv}, where βv = 0 is a vacuum intensity and µ is the
same intensity used in key mode. We optimise over the value of µ and β1, with the condition that µ, β1 ≥ 10−4. This
condition is motivated by the fact that it is experimentally difficult to produce a laser pulse with a very small, but
fixed, intensity.
In Fig. 1, we see that the protocol can overcome the repeaterless bound [3] with as few as four random phases. For
the ideal case of M → ∞, we use Eq. (15), assuming that Alice and Bob are somehow able to estimate the exact
values of Yn, ∀n, using the data collected in test mode. As explained in the discussion following Eq. (15), the case of
M →∞ is not actually implementable in practice, but it provides an upper-bound on the secret key rate obtainable
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Figure 1. Secret key rate for our discrete phase protocol at different values of M , in comparison to fundamental bound for
repeaterless QKD systems − log2(1− η), where η is the overall Alice-Bob transmissivity.
for finite values of M . Notably, Fig. 1 shows that one can get very close to this ideal scenario with only M = 12
random phases.
In Fig. 2, we compare the results of our protocol with those of Ref. [12]. The latter is one of the best performing
variants of TF-QKD, in both the asymptotic [27] and finite-key [28] regimes, that employ continuous phase randomi-
sation. Moreover, its quantum phase is very close to ours, with the only difference being their use of continuous
phase randomisation in test mode. Thus, Fig. 2 directly compares the performance of the discrete and continuous
randomisation approaches. Remarkably, we obtain higher secret-key rates using discrete phase randomisation, as long
as one uses eight random phases or more. This may sound surprising, at first instance, but it is justified by the fact
that, for the same value of µ, we can obtain a tighter estimation of the phase-error rate in the discrete-phase version,
thanks to the test-mode phase postselection. This can be seen in Fig. 3(a), where we compare the upper-bound on
the phase-error rate of the two protocols for a fixed value µ = 0.06. In a practical setting, one would optimise over
the value of µ, in which case the two protocols result in similar bounds for the phase-error rate, see Fig. 3(b). But,
this will be achieved at a higher value of µ for our protocol, see Fig. 3(c), which results in a higher gain, see Fig. 3(d),
hence a higher secret-key rate.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Most previous variants of TF-QKD have relied on the emission of weak laser pulses with a continuous random
phase, which is difficult to achieve and certify in practice. Here, we proposed a practical TF-QKD variant that used
discrete phase randomisation instead. Its security proof relied on post-selecting the test-mode rounds in which both
users employed exactly matching phase values, which is not practically possible with a continuous randomisation
approach. We consequently obtained higher key rates using discrete randomisation. This is interesting, given that
discrete randomisation is usually considered to be a source flaw. In fact, previous analyses of decoy-state QKD with
discrete randomisation [17] obtained strictly worse results than their continuous counterparts. Our security analysis
relied on a customised version of numerical techniques for MDI-QKD protocols based on semidefinite programming,
which had a substantially reduced complexity as compared with the generic approach.
In our analysis, we have considered the asymptotic regime in which Alice and Bob run the protocol for infinitely
many rounds. It remains an open question whether discrete randomisation could still offer an advantage in a finite-key
setting. Since state-of-the-art numerical finite-key proofs can only prove security tightly against a restricted class of
eavesdropping attacks [29, 30], important developments are needed before we can rigorously answer this question.
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Figure 2. Comparison between the results of this work and those of Ref. [12], which uses continuous phase randomisation in its
test-mode emissions. For simplicity, to compute the results in [12], we assume that Alice and Bob’s test-mode rounds provide
perfect estimates of the yield probabilities Ynm for n + m ≤ 4, while the rest are upper-bounded by one. This is an ideal
scenario and, as shown in [12], the results will be slightly worse once one considers the imperfect estimates that result from the
use of a finite set of decoy states, as we do for the results in this work.
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